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This paper uses the random assignment of playing partners in professional golf tournaments to test
for peer effects in the workplace. We find no evidence that the ability of playing partners affects the
performance of professional golfers, contrary to recent evidence on peer effects in the workplace from
laboratory experiments, grocery scanners, and soft-fruit pickers. In our preferred specification, we
can rule out peer effects larger than 0.045 strokes for a one stroke increase in playing partners' ability,
and the point estimates are small and actually negative. We offer several explanations for our contrasting
findings: that workers seek to avoid responding to social incentives when financial incentives are strong;
that there is heterogeneity in how susceptible individuals are to social effects and that those who are
able to avoid them are more likely to advance to elite professional labor markets; and that workers
learn with professional experience not to be affected by social forces. We view our results as complementary
to the existing studies of peer effects in the workplace and as a first step towards explaining how these
social effects vary across labor markets, across individuals and with changes in the form of incentives
faced. In addition to the empirical results on peer effects in the workplace, we also point out that many
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Is an employee’s productivity inﬂuenced by the productivity of his or her nearby co-workers? The
answer to this question is important for the optimal organization of labor in a workplace and for the
optimal design of incentives.1 2 Despite the importance of this question, empirically it is difﬁcult
to address. The main difﬁculty is that it is hard to disentangle whether an observed correlation in
behavior is due to the effect of the group’s behavior on individual behavior (‘endogenous effects’),
the effect of the group’s characteristics on individual’sbehavior (‘contextual effects’), or the corre-
lation between observed and unobserved determinants of the outcome (‘correlated effects’).3 Only
the ﬁrst two of these effects represent true peer effects.4
Despite this identiﬁcation problem, a few empirical studies have found evidence that peer ef-
fects are importantin several workplace settings: among low-wageworkers at a grocery store(Mas
and Moretti, 2006), among soft-fruit pickers (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2007), and among
workers performing a simple task in a laboratory setting (Falk and Ichino, 2006). The present
study contributes to this literature by estimating the importance of peer effects among elite profes-
sionals: male professional golfers on the PGA Tour. Moreover, this is the ﬁrst ﬁeld study of peer
effects in the workplace that has explicit random assignment of peers.
In the ﬁrst two rounds of PGA tournaments, players are randomly assigned to groups of three
conditional on their category, which takes one of three values and is determined using a simple
formula that depends on past performance. Within a playing group, players are proximate to
one another and can therefore observe each others’ shots and scores. This proximity creates the
1The relevancefor the optimal design of incentives hinges on whether social effects are complementsor substitutes
for ﬁnancial incentives.
2Complementarities between an employee’s productivity and the productivity of his peers may arise for at least
three reasons: (1) individuals may learn from their co-workers about how best to perform a given task, (2) workers
may be motivated to exert effort when they see their co-workers working hard or performing well or when they know
their co-workers are watching, or (3) the nature of the production process may be such that the productivity of one
worker mechanically inﬂuences the productivityof another worker directly (e.g. the assembly line). While the former
two sources are ‘behavioral’, the latter is a mechanical effect that arises for purely structural or technological reasons.
For clarity, we label the ﬁrst two of these effects ‘peer effects’ and the last effect a ‘production complementarity’.
3For example, members of a group might be hit by a commonshock that affects behavior independentof spillovers
or social interactions.
4See Manski (1993) and Mofﬁtt (2001) for descriptions of the problems associated with estimating peer effects.
An additional difﬁculty is what Manski calls the ’reﬂection problem’. To understand the reﬂection problem, consider
trying to estimate the effect of individual i’s behavior on individual j’s behavior. It is very difﬁcult to tell which
member of the pair is affecting the other’s behavior, and whether the affected behavior by one member of the pair
affects the other’s in turn, and so on.
1opportunity to learn from and be motivated by peers.
There are several learning opportunities during a round. For example, a player must judge
the direction of the wind when hitting his approach shot to the putting green. Wind introduces
uncertainty into shot and club selection. Thus, by observing the ball ﬂight of others in the playing
group, a player can reduce this uncertainty and increase his chance of hitting a successful shot.
Another example is the putting green. Subtle slopes, moisture, and the type of grass all affect the
direction and speed of a putt. The chance to learn how a skilled putter manages these conditions
may confer an advantage to a peer golfer.
Turning to motivation, there are several ways that motivation can affect performance. The
chance to visualize a good shot may help a player to execute his own shot successfully. Similarly,
seeing a competitor play well may directly motivate a player and help him to focus his mental
attention on the task at hand. Still more, a player’s self-conﬁdence, and in turn his performance
(Benabou and Tirole, 2002), may be directly affected by the abilitiesorplay ofhis peers (Festinger,
1954).
In the parlance of the social interactions literature, this playing group is a player’s reference
group and within it a player’s actions may be inﬂuenced by the group’s actions and/or characteris-
tics. We construct measures of player abilityusinginformation on past performance and we test for
peer effects by considering whether (random) variation in peers’ ability affects own performance.
The main result of this paper is that neither the ability nor the current performance of playing
partners affect the performance of professional golfers. In our preferred speciﬁcation, we can rule
out peer effects larger than 0.045 strokes for a 1 stroke increase in playing partners’ ability and our
point estimate is actually negative. The results are robust to alternative peer effects speciﬁcations.
We offer several explanations for our contrasting ﬁndings: (1) that workers seek to avoid the social
effects found in previous studies when there are strong performance-based ﬁnancial incentives;
(2) that there is heterogeneity in how susceptible individuals are to social effects and that those
who are able to avoid them are more likely to advance to elite professional labor markets; and
(3) that workers learn with professional experience not to be affected by social forces. We view
these results as complementary to the existing studies of peer effects in the workplace, a ﬁrst
step towards explaining how these social effects vary across labor markets, across individuals and
with changes in the form of incentives. That there might be heterogeneity in peer effects is
2particularly important in light of the fact that previous studies typically focus on low-skill jobs or
take place in the laboratory. If we are correct that high-skilled professionals are less susceptible
to social pressures at work, this ﬁnding is relevant for large parts of the labor market for which
there currently exists no evidence on peer effects (e.g. ﬁnancial professionals, lawyers, doctors,
professors).
Our study contributes to the literature on peer effects in the workplace in six important ways.
First, we make a methodological point concerning a bias inherent in most typical peer effects re-
gressions and suggest a simple correction. Because individuals cannot be their own peers, even
random assignment generates a negativecorrelation in pre-determined characteristics of peers. In-
tuitively, the urn from which the peers of an individual are drawn does not include the individual.
Thus, the population at risk to be peers with high-ability individuals is on average lower ability
than the population at risk to be peers with low-ability individuals. As a result, the typical test
for random assignment, a regression of i’s predetermined characteristic on the mean characteristic
of i’s peers, produces a slightly negative coefﬁcient even when peers are truly randomly assigned.
Because this mechanism causes negative correlation in both observed and unobserved character-
istics of peers, most regression-based tests of peer effects are affected by it. We present results
from Monte Carlo simulations showing that this bias can be reasonably large, and that it is de-
creasing in the size of the population from which peers are selected. We then propose a simple
solution to this problem—controlling for the average ability of the population at risk to be the in-
dividual’s peers—and show that including this additional regressor produces test statistics that are
well-behaved.
Second, our research design—the random assignment of peers—allows us to estimate the
causal effect of a playing partners’ ability on own performance. To our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst
ﬁeld study of peer effects in the workplace to have explicit random assignment of co-workers.
Third, the design of golf tournaments allows us to test directly for the most likely sources of
common shocks. As pointed out by Manski (1993), even with random assignment a correlation of
own outcome with the outcome of the group is not informative on the importance of endogenous
peer effects if there are common unobserved shocks. We use the performance of nearby groups,
those who are playing a few holes ahead or behind the reference group, to measure the role of
common shocks (e.g. from common weather conditions which vary over the course of the day).
3Fourth, our results are purged of ‘relative performance effects’ because the objective for each
player in a golf tournament is to score the lowest, regardless of with whom that player is playing.5
Pay is based on relative performance, but performance is compared to the entire ﬁeld of entrants
in a tournament, not relative to the players within a playing group. This contrasts with other
settings, such as classrooms, where the performance of an individual is assessed relative to the
individual’s peers. For example, it tells us nothing about whether students learn from smarter
peers if individuals try harder because of incentives created by relative performance evaluation in
the classroom. In a golf tournament, there is no reason (other than better information about how
the player next to him is doing) for a player to care more about the performance of his playing
partner than about anyone else in the tournament.6
Fifth, the set-up of golf tournaments allows us to identify peer effects in a setting devoid of
most production-technology complementarities. This is unlike, for example, the grocery store
setting considered in Mas and Moretti (2006), where a grocery store scanner’s productivity may
depend on the productivity of nearby scanners for the simple reason that a customer’s incentive is
to choose the fastest aisle.
Sixth, though we present a basic result based on an overall measure of skill, we have multi-
dimensional measures of ability that line up nicely with important potential underlying mecha-
nisms of peer effects. In particular, we are in principle able to distinguish between learning effects
and motivational effects, the latter of which are more psychological in nature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature, section 3
brieﬂy describes the PGA Tour, section 4 describes the methodological point concerning bias in
typical peer effects regressions, section 5 shows results verifying the random assignment mecha-
nism, section 6 discusses our empirical approach, section 7 discusses the validity of our empirical
strategy and our results and section 8 concludes.
5This objective is accurate for almost every player, except perhaps the players who have a reasonable probability
of earning the top few prizes. In those cases the objective is actually to score lower than your opponents (where your
opponentsare the small universeof players who are competingwith you for the top prizes). With this concernin mind,
in our results section we drop top-tier players as a robustness check which does not change our main results.
6The scores of the current tournament leaders are typically posted around the course so that golfers have informa-
tion about how they are playing relative to players outside of their group. This information makes the information
about how their playing partners are performing signiﬁcantly less valuable.
42 Related Literature
It has long been recognized by psychologists that an individual’s performance might be inﬂuenced
by his peers. The ﬁrst study to show evidence of such peer effects was Triplett (1898), who noted
that cyclists raced faster when they were pitted against one another, and slower when they raced
only against a clock. While Triplett’s study shows that the presence of others can facilitate per-
formance, others found that the presence of others can inhibit performance. In particular, Allport
(1924) found that people in a group setting wrote more refutations of a logical argument, but that
the quality of the work was lower than when they worked alone. Similarly Pessin (1933) found
that the presence of a spectator reduced individual performance on a memory task. Zajonc (1965)
resolved these paradoxical ﬁndings by pointing out that the task in these experimental setups var-
ied in a way that confounded the results. In particular, he argued that for well-learned or innate
tasks, the presence of others improves performance. For complex tasks however, he argued that
the presence of others worsens performance.
Guided by the intuition that peers may affect behavior and hence market outcomes, several
economic studies of peer effects have recently emerged in a variety of domains. Examples include
education (Graham, 2004), crime (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Sacerdote, 1996), unemployment in-
surance take-up (Kroft, 2007), welfare participation (Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan, 2000),
and retirement planning (Duﬂo and Saez, 2004). The remainder of this section reviews three pa-
pers that are conceptually most similar to our research, in that they attempt to measure peer effects
in the workplace or in a work-like task.
The ﬁrst economic study of peer effects in a work-like setting is a laboratory experiment con-
ducted by Falk and Ichino (2006). This experiment measures how an individual’s productivity is
inﬂuenced by the presence of another individual working on the same task: stufﬁng letters into en-
velopes. They ﬁnd moderate and signiﬁcant peer effects: a 10% increase in peers’ output increases
a given individual’s effort by 1.4%. A criticism of this study is one that applies broadly to other
studies in the lab; in particular, that it may have low external validity because of experimenter de-
mand effects or because experimental subjects get paid minimal fees to participate and as a result
their incentives may be weak (Levitt and List, 2007).7
7Another concernaboutlaboratoryexperimentsis that subjects are preventedfromsorting into environmentsbased
on their social preferences (Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber, 2006).
5Two recent studies of peer effects in the workplace have examined data collected from the ﬁeld.
Mas and Moretti (2006) measure peer effects directly in the workplace using grocery scanner data.
There is not explicit randomization, but the authors present evidence that the assignment of work-
ers to shifts appears haphazard. Since grocery store managers do not measure individual output
directly in a team production setting, one might expect to observe signiﬁcant free riding and sub-
optimal effort. Instead, this study ﬁnds evidence of signiﬁcant peer effects with magnitudes similar
to those found by Falk and Ichino (2006): a 10% increase in the average permanent productivity
of co-workers increases a given worker’s effort by 1.7%. As Mas and Moretti discuss in their
paper, grocery scanner is an occupation where compensation is not very responsive to changes in
individual effort and output. They conjecture that “economic incentives alone may not be enough
to explain what motivates [a] worker to exert effort in these jobs.”
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2007) examine how the identity and skills of nearby workers
affect the productivity of soft-fruit pickers on a farm. Assignment of workers to rows of fruit is
made by a combination of managers. Though assignment is not explicitly random, the authors
present evidence to support the claim that it is orthogonal to worker productivity. The authors ﬁnd
thatproductivityrespondsto thepresence ofafriend workingnearby, butdo notshowevidencethat
productivity responds to the skill-levelof non-friend co-workers. High-skilled workers slow down
when working next to a less productive friend, and low-skilled workers speed up when working
next to a more productive friend. Workers are paid piece rates in this setting and are willing to
forgo income to conform to a social norm along with friends. The authors also ﬁnd that workers
respond to the cost of conforming: on high-yield days the relatively high-skilled friend slows down
less and the relatively low-skilled friend works harder.
In light of the fact that monetary incentives are weaker in the Mas and Moretti (2006) study
than in Bandiera, et al.’s (2007), it is interesting to note that Mas and Moretti (2006) ﬁnd more
general peer effects. A recent paper by Lemieux et al. (2006) points out that an increasing fraction
ofUS jobs containsometypeof performancepay based eitheron a commission,abonus, ora piece
rate.8 Since neither of the aforementioned studies contain very strong economic incentives, it is
natural to ask whether peer effects also exist in settings that do.9 In the setting that we consider—
8Using the CPS, the authors ﬁnd that the overall incidence of performance pay was a little more than 30 percent in
the late 1970’s but grew to over 40 percent by the late 1990’s.
9In a prior paper, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005) ﬁnd an increase in effort in response to a switch in com-
6professional golftournaments—compensationis determined purely by performance.10 Pay is high
and the pay structure is quite convex. For example, during the 2006 PGA season, the top prize
money earner, Tiger Woods, earned almost $10 million, and 93 golfers earned in excess of $1
million during the season. We discuss the convexity of tournament payouts later in the paper.
The existing ﬁeld studies in the literature on peer effects in the workplace have focused on low-
skilled jobs in particular industries. It is possible that there is heterogeneity in how susceptible
individuals are to social effects at work. Motivated by this, we ask whether peer effects exist in
workplaces made up of highly skilled professional workers.11
In terms of research design, our study is related to Sacerdote (2001) and Zimmerman (2003),
who measure peer effects in higher education using the random assignment of dorm roommates
at Dartmouth and Williams Colleges, respectively. Sacerdote ﬁnds that an increase in room-
mate’s GPA by 1 point increases own freshman year GPA by 0.120. The coefﬁcient on roommate’s
GPA, however, drops signiﬁcantly—from 0.120 to 0.068—when dorm ﬁxed effects are included,
suggesting that common shocks might be driving some of the correlation in GPAs between room-
mates. As we discuss below, we are able to test directly for the most likely source of common
shocks to golfers.12
3 Background and Data
3.1 Institutional Details of the PGA Tour
Relevant Rules.13 There is a prescribed set of rules to determine the order of play. The player with
the best (i.e. lowest) score from the previous hole takes his initial shot ﬁrst, followed by the player
with the next best score from the previous hole. After that, the player who is farthest from the hole
pensation regime from relative pay to piece rate pay. Their evidence suggests that social preferences can be offset by
appropriate monetary incentives.
10Golfers also receive a sizeable amount from professional endorsements. Presumably, endorsement earnings are
related indirectly to performance. Tiger Woods, the golfer with the highest earnings from tournaments is also the
golfer with the greatest endorsement income.
11In Section 7.5, we will also look at whether there are heterogeneous peer effects within this class of professional
workers.
12Finally, other studies have used professional golf data to test economic theories. Bognanno and Ehrenberg(1990)
test whether professional golf tournaments elicit effort responses. They ﬁnd that the level and structure of prizes in
PGA tournaments inﬂuence players’ performance. However, Orszag (1994) shows their results might not be robust
once weather shocks are accounted for.
13Appendix A gives a short introduction to the basic rules of golf.
7always shoots next.14
Selection. Golfers from all over the world participate in PGA tournaments that are held (al-
most) every week.15 At the end of each season, the top 125 earners in PGA Tour events are made
full-time members of the PGA Tour for the following year. Those not in the top 125 and anyone
else who wants to become a full-time member of the PGA Tour must go to ‘Qualifying School’,
where there are a limited number of spots availableto the top ﬁnishers. For most PGA Tour tourna-
ments, the players have the right but not the obligation to participate in the tournament. In practice,
there is variation in the fraction of tournaments played by PGA Tour players. The median player
plays in about 59 percent of a season’s tournaments.16 Some players avoid tournaments that do
not have a large enough purse or a high prestige, while other players might avoid tournaments that
require a substantial amount of travel. Bronars and Oettinger (2001) look directly at several deter-
minants of selection into golf tournaments; they ﬁnd a substantial effect of the level of the purse
on entry decisions. Most relevant for our purposes is the fact that because membership on the tour
for the following year is based on earnings, lower-earning players have an incentive to enter tour-
naments that higher-skilled players choose not to enter. It is therefore necessary to condition on
tournament-by-category ﬁxed effects in the empirical work since random assignment takes place at
this level. Conditional on the set of players who enter a tournament, playing partners are randomly
assigned within categories. Unconditional on this fully interacted set of ﬁxed effects, assignment
is not random.
Tournament Details. Tournaments are generally four rounds of 18 holes played over four days,
and prizes are awarded based on the cumulative performance of the players over all four rounds.
14In general we expect better players to be more likely to shoot ﬁrst on the initial shot of a hole, but worse players
are more likely to shoot ﬁrst on subsequent shots on the hole. This offsetting pattern leads us to believe that the order
of play does not signiﬁcantly affect the peer effects we estimate. If one could collect shot-by-shot data, it would be
interesting to examine whether behavior is affected by players that shoot immediately prior.
15In 2007, there were 47 PGA tournaments played over 44 weeks. The three instances where there are two tour-
naments during a week are the ‘major championships.’ Because these championships are only for qualifying golfers
fromaroundthe world (andnot exclusivelyfor PGA Tour members), and becausethese tournamentsare not sponsored
by the PGA Tour, the PGA Tour also hosts tournaments during the major championships for the remaining PGA Tour
members who did not qualify for the major tournaments. We drop all the major championships from our data set
because they do not use the same random assignment mechanism.
16Since most players play in most tournaments, when we construct our measure of ability we will usually have
enough past tournament results to reliably estimate the ability of each player. The median player has 30 past tourna-
ment results with which to estimate his ability, 29 percent of the players have more than 40 past tournaments, and 14
percent of the players have fewer than 5 tournaments. We weight all regressions by the number of past performance
observations used to compute ability.
8At theend ofthe second round, thereis a ‘cut’ that eliminatesapproximatelyhalfof thetournament
ﬁeld based on cumulative performance over the ﬁrst two rounds. Most tournaments have 130-160
players, and the cut reduces the ﬁeld to the top 70 players (plus ties) after the ﬁrst two rounds.
Economic Incentives. In order to earn prize money, players must survive the cut.17 The prize
structure is extremely convex: ﬁrst prize is generally 18 percent of the total purse. Also, because
better performance will also likely lead to endorsement money, the true economic incentives are
even stronger. Figure 1 shows the convexity in the prize structure of a typical tournament, and
Table 2 shows the distribution of total purses in our sample. Below we examine whether the
tournament prize structure and purse size affect player performance.
Assignment Rule. Players are continuously assigned to one of three categories according to
rules described in detail in Appendix B. Players in category 1 are typically tournament winners
from thecurrent orpreviousyear orplayers inthetop 25on theearnings listfromthepreviousyear.
These include players such as Tiger Woods, Phil Mickelson and Ernie Els. Players in category 2
are typically thosebetween 26 and 125 on the earnings list from the previous year, and players who
have made at least 50 cuts during their career or who are currently ranked among the top 50 on the
World Golf Rankings. This group is the largest in most tournaments and includes players such as
NickFaldoandJohnDaly. Category3consistsofallotherentrantsinthetournament. Withinthese
categories, tournaments then randomly assign playing partners to groups of three golfers.18 These
groups then play together for the ﬁrst two rounds of the tournament. We evaluate performance
from the ﬁrst two rounds only, since in the third and fourth rounds players are assigned based on
performance of the previous rounds.
3.2 Data
Key Variables. We collected information on tee times, groupings, results, earnings, course slope
and rating, and player statistics and characteristics from the PGA Tour website and various other
17There is no entry fee for PGA Tour members to play in PGA tournaments. Non-members must pay a nominal
$400 entry fee.
18This is similar to the random assignment mechanism used to assign roommates at Dartmouth, as discussed in
Sacerdote (2000)—conditionalon an observable characteristic, there is random assignment within individuals sharing
that characteristic.
9websites.19 Most of our data spans the 1999-2006 golf seasons; however, we only have tee times,
groupings (i.e. the peer groups) and categories for the 2002, 2005, and 2006 seasons.20 As dis-
cussed below, to construct a pre-determined ability measure, we use the 1999, 2000, and 2001 data
for the players from the 2002 season and the 2003 and 2004 for the players from the 2005 and
2006 seasons.21 Our data therefore allow us to observe the performance of the same individuals
playing in many PGA tournaments over three seasons (2002, 2005, and 2006).
We also collected a rich set of disaggregated player statistics for all years of the sample. These
variables were collected in hopes of shedding light on the mechanism through which the peer
effects operate. These measures of skill include the average number of putts per round, average
driving distance, and a measure of accuracy, the average number of greens hit in regulation (the
fraction of times a golfer gets the ball onto the green in at least two shots less than par). We discuss
below how these measures might allow us to separately identify two speciﬁc forms of peer effects:
learning and motivation.
Sample Selection. As discussed in more detail in Appendix B, the scores from some tour-
naments must be dropped because random assignment rules are not followed. The four most
prestigious tournaments (called ‘major championships’) do not use the same conditionally ran-
dom assignment mechanism. For example, the U.S. Open openly admits to creating ‘compelling’
groups to stimulate television ratings. The vast majority of PGA tournaments, however, use the
same random assignment mechanism, and we have conﬁrmed this through several personal com-
munications with the PGA Tour, and through statistical tests reported below.
3.3 A Measure of Ability
In order to estimate peer effects, we require a measure of ability or skill for every player. We
construct this measure by averaging playing scores in prior years.22 There is a problem with using
a player’s raw scoring average as a proxy for ability, however. There is heterogeneity in golf
19We gathered data from www.pgatour.com, www.espn.com, www.usatoday.com, and www.cnnsi.com, and
www.yahoo.com.
20Tee times were collected each Thursday during the 2002 season since a historical list was not maintained either
on web sites or by the PGA Tour at that time. The 2005 and 2006 tee times were collected subsequently in an effort
to increase sample size and power.
21We use only the ﬁrst two rounds to construct our measure of pre-determined ability.
22Sinceourpeereffectsspeciﬁcationsonlyusetheﬁrst tworoundsofatournament,we constructourabilitymeasure
using only the ﬁrst two rounds from earlier tournaments.
10course difﬁculty and better players tend to self-select into tournaments with harder courses. As a
result, differences in measured scoring average tend to understate differences in true ability.
We address this problem using a simpliﬁed form of the ofﬁcial handicap correction used by the
United States Golf Association (USGA), the major golf authority that oversees the ofﬁcial rules of
the game. The USGA measures the difﬁculty for most golf courses in the United States. Using
data on scores from golfers of different skill levels, the USGA assigns a slope and a rating which
can respectively be thought of as related to the estimated slope and intercept from a regression of
score on ability.23 We adjust the scores using the slope and rating and take the average of these
adjusted scores from prior years for each player.24 We have also experimented with several other
measures of ability including using the (raw) past scoring average and a best linear predictor, and
we have found qualitatively similar results.
4 Bias in Typical Peer Effects Tests
4.1 Explaining the problem
Before presenting the empirical results, in this section we describe an important methodological
consideration. Given the importance of random assignment, papers that report estimates of peer
effects typically present statistical evidence to buttress the case that assignment of peers is random,
or as good as random. The typical test is an OLS regression of individual i’s predetermined
characteristic x on the average x of i’s peers, conditional on any variables on which randomization
was conditioned. The argument is made that if assignment of peers is random, or if selection into
peer groups is ignorable, then this regression should yield a coefﬁcient of zero. In our case, this
regression would be of the form
Abilityikt = p1+p2×Ability−i,kt +dtc+eikt (1)
23To compute a golfer’s handicap, the USGA ﬁrst computes the handicap differential for each of the golfer’s last
20 scores according to the formula: handicap differential = (score-rating)*(113/slope). The USGA normalizes slope
such that 113 is the slope of a course of ‘standard difﬁculty’. The handicap index is then calculated as 0.96 times the
average of the lowest 10 handicap differentials from the most recent 20 scores.
24This differs from the ofﬁcial handicap measure used by the USGA in one important way. The ofﬁcial measure is
based on the best ten of the players most recent twenty completed rounds. The USGA measure is intended to be used
to allow amateur golfers of differing abilities to compete against each other. Since we are interested in a measure of
skill, we average over all prior rounds in our sample.
11where i indexes players, k indexes (peer) groups, t indexes tournaments, c indexes categories, and
dtc is a fully interacted set of tournament-by-category dummies, including main effects. This is,
for example, the test for random assignment reported in Sacerdote (2001).
This test for the random assignment of individuals to groups is not generally well-behaved.
The problem stems from the fact that an individual cannot be assigned to himself. In a sense,
sampling of peers is done without replacement—the individual himself is removed from the ‘urn’
from which his peers are chosen. As a result, the peers for high-ability individuals are chosen
from a group with a slightly lower mean ability than the peers for low-ability individuals.
Consider an example in which four individuals are randomly assigned to groups of two. To
make the example concrete, let the individuals have pre-determined abilities 1, 2, 3, and 4. If pairs
are randomly selected, there are three possible sets of pairs. Individual 1 has an equal chance of
being paired with either 2, 3, or 4. So, the ex-ante average ability of his partner is 3. Individual
4 has an equal chance of being paired with either 1, 2, or 3, and thus the ex-ante average ability
of his partner is 2. This mechanical relationship between own ability and the mean ability of
randomly-assignedpeers—which is a general problem in all peer effects studies—causesestimates
of equation (1) to produce negative values of b p2. Random assignment appears non-random, and
positively matched peers can appear randomly matched.
This bias is decreasing in the size of the population from which peers are drawn, i.e. the size of
the ‘urn’. As the urn increases in size, each individual contributes less to the average ability of the
population from which peers are drawn, and the difference in average ability of potential peers for
low and high ability individuals converges to zero. In settings where peers are drawn from large
groups, ignoring this mechanical relationship is inconsequential. In our case, the average urn size
is 60, and 25 percent of the time the urn size is less than 18.
We present Monte Carlo results in Figure 2 which conﬁrm that estimates of (1) are negatively
biased and that the bias is decreasing in the size of the urn. We report the results from two
simulations. For the ﬁrst simulation, we created 55 players with ability drawn from a normal
distribution with mean zero and standard deviation one. We then created 100 tournaments and for
each tournament randomly selected M players. Each of these M players were then assigned to
groups of three. M, which corresponds to the size of the urn from which peers were drawn, was
randomly chosen to be either 39, 42, 45, 48, or 51 with equal probability for an average M of 45.
12We explain below the reason for the variation in M. Finally, we estimated an OLS regression of
own ability on the average of partners’ ability, controlling for tournament ﬁxed effects, and the
estimate of b p2 and p-values were saved. This procedure was repeated 10,000 times. For the
second simulation, we increased the average size of M by creating 550 players, and allowing M to
take on values of 444, 447, 450, 453, and 456 with equal probability for an average M of 450.
The results from the ﬁrst simulation are shown on the left side of Figure 2. As predicted, the
typical OLS randomization test is not well behaved. The test substantially overrejects, rejecting at
the5-percent levelmorethan 18 percent ofthetime. Eventhoughpeers are randomlyassigned, the
estimated correlation between abilities of peers is on average -0.046. This negative relationship is
exactly as one should expect, resulting from the fact that individuals cannot be their own peers.
The intuitive argument made above also implies that the size of the bias should be decreasing
in M. Indeed, this is the case. The right side of Figure 2 shows results from the second simulation
where the urn size was increased by an order of magnitude. The typical randomization test is
more well-behaved. The estimates of b p2 center around zero, the test rejects at the 5-percent level
5.4 percent of the time, and p-values are close to uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. In short,
the Monte Carlo results show that the typical test for randomization is biased when the set of
individuals from which peers are drawn is relatively small.
Bias stemming from this problem is not limited to tests of random assignment. The argument
above applies to unobserved characteristics just as it does to observed characteristics. Because no
one can be his own peer, individuals with high unobservables are at risk to be peers with individ-
uals who have lower average unobservables than individuals with low unobservables are. Thus,
regressions of individual i’s outcome on the average characteristics or outcomes of his peers are
also negatively biased. F-tests on sets of indicator variables for being peers with individual j are
also biased for the same reason. Being paired with individual j is informative about individual i’s
observables and unobservables.
134.2 A proposed solution
To our knowledge, this point has not been made clearly in the literature.25 We propose a simple
correction to equation (1) that will produce a well-behaved test of random assignment of peers,
even with small urn sizes. Since the bias stems from the fact that each individual’speers are drawn
from a population with a different mean ability, we simply control for that mean. Speciﬁcally, we
add to equation (1) the mean ability of all individuals in the urn, excluding individual i. The
modiﬁed estimating equation is thus
Abilityikt = p1+p2×Ability−i,kt +dtc+j×Ability−i,ct +uikt (2)
where Ability−i,ct is the mean ability of all players in the same category×tournament cell as player
i, other than player i himself (i.e. all individuals that are eligible to be matched with individual i),
and j is a parameter to be estimated. It should be noted that it is necessary for there to be variation
in the set of players in player i’s urn to be able to estimate this regression.26
Figure 3 shows the results from Monte Carlo simulations analogous to those reported above.
The difference here is that instead of estimating the typical OLS regression, we include Ability−i,ct
as an additional regressor. As can be seen clearly in the ﬁgure, the addition of this control makes
the OLS test of randomization well-behaved regardless of whether average urn size is large or
small. In both cases, the estimated correlation of peers ability centers around zero, the test rejects
at the 5-percent level approximately 5 percent of the time, and p-values are approximately uni-
formly distributedbetween 0 and 1. In results not reported here wehavealso conﬁrmed thatthe test
can detect deviations from random assignment. Going forward, we therefore include Ability−i,ct
as a control in all speciﬁcations, both tests for random assignment and tests of peer effects.
25The closest discussion of which we are aware is by Boozer and Cacciola (2001), who point out that the ability to
detect peer effects in a linear-in-meansregression of outcomeson mean outcomes is related to the size of the reference
group, but they do not link this discussion to tests for random assignment nor to the fact that individuals cannot be
assigned to themselves as peers.
26If every urn has N players, then my ability Abilityiktr is related to the mean ability in my urn Abilityct and the
‘leave-me-out’ mean Ability−i,ct by the following identity: Abilityiktr = N ∗Abilityct −(N−1)∗Ability−i,ct.
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Using our various measures of ability, we now test the claim that assignment to playing groups
is random within a tournament conditional on the player’s category.27 In this section, we report
results from estimating variations of speciﬁcation (2), with various measures of pre-determined
ability. Before reporting those results, however, we ﬁrst report the results of estimating equation
(2) with only tournament ﬁxed effects (i.e. dropping category ﬁxed effects and tournament-by-
category interactions). We do this to show that the randomization test has sufﬁcient power to
detect deviations from random assignment in a setting where we know assignment is not random.
Theresults are shown in column(1) ofTable 1. Thecoefﬁcient on average partners’ abilityis 0.159
and is stronglystatisticallysigniﬁcant. In column (2) we showresults from estimatingequation (2)
with only category ﬁxed effects (i.e dropping tournament ﬁxed effects and tournament-by-category
interactions): the coefﬁcient on average partners’ ability is 0.116 and is strongly statisticallysignif-
icant. The former result is consistent with the fact that players are not unconditionally randomly
assigned within a tournament. Stratiﬁcation by category means that better players are grouped
with better players. The latter indicates that even conditional on category, players of similar abili-
ties select into similar tournaments, which is exactly what we would expect if lower-ability players
strategically choose tournaments that higher-ability players avoid, since pay within tournaments is
based on performance relative to the tournament’s actual entrants (Bronars and Oettinger, 2001).
Importantly, both results show that the test is powerful enough to reject random assignment in a
situation where we know assignment was not conditionally random.
We next present the results of the correct randomization test, which includes the full set of
tournament-by-category ﬁxed effects along with the control for Ability−i,ct. These results are
shown in column (3). The estimate of the correlation between own ability and playing partners’
ability is small and insigniﬁcant. This is just as is implied by the random assignment mechanism
that the PGA Tour claims to use. We also test for random assignment using various disagreggated
measures of ability (e.g. driving distance, putts per round and greens in regulation per round). If
players are conditionally randomly assigned to groups, these measures should not be correlated
conditional on the correct set of variables described above. The results of estimating equation
27This claim is based on the PGA Player Handbook and Tournament Regulations, and on numerous telephone
conversations with PGA Tour ofﬁcials.
15(1), replacing average adjusted score with these measures, are shown in columns (4), (5), and (6)
of Table 1. The coefﬁcients on the other characteristics are also statistically insigniﬁcant and the
point estimates are small. Lastly, columns (7)-(9) separately estimate the randomization equation
by category, which also shows no evidence of deviations from conditional random assignment.
Overall, we interpret the results of Table 1 as supporting the claim that the PGA Tour assigns
players randomly to groups conditional on categories.
6 Empirical Framework
To estimate peer effects, the data are analyzed using a simple linear model where own score de-
pends on own ability and playing partners’ ability. The key identifying assumption is that, condi-
tional on tournament and category, players are randomly assigned to groups.28 Thus by controlling
for tournament-speciﬁc category ﬁxed effects, we can estimate the causal effect of playing part-
ners’ ability on own score. Our baseline speciﬁcation is
Scoreiktr = a1+b1×Abilityi+g1×Ability−i,kt +dtc+j1×Ability−i,ct +eiktr (3)
where i indexes players, k indexes groups, t indexes tournaments29, r indexes each of the ﬁrst two
rounds of a tournament, c indexes categories, dtc is a full set of tournament-by-category dummies
to be estimated, a1, b1, g1, and j1 are parameters, and e is an error term. The parameter g1
measures the effect of the average ability of playing partners on own score, and is our primary
measure of peer effects. Its magnitude is generally evaluated in relation to the magnitude of b1,
which is the effect of own ability on own score. Since playing partners are randomly assigned,
the coefﬁcients in equation (3) can be estimated consistently using OLS. The parameter j1 is the
same ‘leave-me-out’ mean correction described in the previous section. Because we included it in
the randomization test, we also include it here, although it does not affect any of our results.
Even with the handicap correction described above, a remaining potential problem with our
measure of ability is measurement error. This should be a concern for all studies of peer effects
28This is the assumption that was tested empirically in section 5.
29For the remainder of this paper, we deﬁne a ‘tournament’ to be a tournament-by-year cell, since our dataset has
several tournaments that are played again in subsequent years. For example, the Ford Championship in 2002 has a
separate dummy than the Ford Championship in 2005.
16in the workplace that estimate exogenous effects. A nice feature of the speciﬁcation above is
that it contains a simple correction for measurement error. Because they are measured using the
same variable, there should be the same degree of measurement error in each golfer’s individual
measure of ability. If each golfer had a single peer, the estimates of ˆ b1 and ˆ g1 would be equally
attenuated. The ratio ˆ g1/ˆ b1 would in that case give us a measurement-error-corrected estimate
of the reduced-form exogenous peer effect. Because in our case Ability−i,kt is an average of two
values, it is likely to be less error-ridden. We therefore take ˆ g1/ˆ b1 to be an upper bound of the
measurement-error-corrected estimate of the reduced-form exogenous peer effect.
A key advantage to estimating the reduced-form speciﬁcation in (3) is that the average abil-
ity of playing partners is a pre-determined characteristic. Thus, our estimate of g1 is unlikely
to be biased due to the presence of common unobserved shocks.30 An alternative commonly
estimated speciﬁcation replaces peers’ ability with peers’ score. This outcome-on-outcome spec-
iﬁcation estimates a combination of endogenous and contextual effects, but intuitively examines
how performance relates to the contemporaneous performance of peers, rather than just to peers’
predetermined skills. Even with random assignment, however, one cannot rule out that a positive
relationship between own score and peers’ score is driven by shocks commonly experienced by
individuals within a peer group. We nevertheless run regressions of the following form to get an
upper bound on the magnitude of peer effects:
Scoreiktr = a2+b2×Abilityi+g2×Score−i,ktr +dtc+j2×Ability−i,ct +niktr (4)
where Score−i,kt is the average score in the current round of player i’s playing partners. Because
common shocks are expected to cause upward bias, the estimate of g2 should be viewed as an
upper bound on the extent of peer effects. A nice feature of our setup also allows us to gauge
the magnitude of the bias created by common shocks since we can observe the scores of nearby
playing groups, who are likely to be affected by similar shocks. We report estimates that take
advantage of this feature of the research design in the following section.
30Note however that these common shocks are likely to affect the standard errors. Hence in the peer effect regres-
sions below, we cluster at the group level. The estimated standard errors are virtually unchanged if we cluster by
tournament×category,and are actually smaller if we cluster by tournament.
177 Results
7.1 Summary Statistics
Before turning to the main results of the paper we ﬁrst present the descriptive statistics in Table
2. It is important to understand the units of our primary variables of interest. Score is a variable
that represents the actual golf score the player achieved in a given tournament-round. Ability is
in the same units as Score (i.e. golf strokes). Usually the player’s score is measured relative to
the par on the course, which is typically 72 strokes. Ability, while in the same units as Score, is
typically expressed as deviation of score from par. Throughout the results section, it is helpful
to keep in mind that lower scores in golf indicate better performance (and, analogously, a lower
Ability measure indicates a higher ability player).
Figures 4 and 5 show the distribution of handicap both in the full sample, and broken down by
categories. Two things should be noted from these ﬁgures. First, there is a reasonable amount of
variation in ability even among professional golfers. The difference between the 90th percentile
and 10th percentile in adjusted average score—our baseline measure of ability—is 1.65. Perhaps
more importantly, given the stratiﬁcation by category prior to random assignment, is that much of
the variance in ability remains after separating by categories. As can be seen clearly in Figure
5, the average scores increase monotonically from category 1 to category 3. However, there is a
great deal of overlap in the distributions. The 90-10 differences in measured ability in category
1, 2, and 3 are 1.71, 1.38, and 2.38 strokes respectively. These differences represent wide ranges
in ability — using our data on earnings, a reduction in handicap of 1.65 translates into an increase
in expected earnings of 70 percent.31 This suggests that differences in strokes on this order of
magnitude should be quite salient to players.
There is also agood deal of variationacross players in speciﬁc dimensionsof past performance.
The 90th percentile golfer drives the ball 24 yards farther than the golfer at the 10th percentile in
average driving distance. This is 8.6 percent of the mean drive. For putting, the differences are
similar: the 90th percentile putter hits 2.4 fewer putts per round than the 10th percentile putter
(8.3 percent of the mean). And for accuracy, the 90-10 difference is 12.6 percent of the mean for
31A regression of log earnings on handicap with a full set of tournament ﬁxed effects, category ﬁxed effects and
their interactions gives a coefﬁcient on handicap of -0.320 with a t-statistic of 13.24. Thus a reduction in handicap of
1.65 will increase earnings by 0.528 log points, or 69.6%.
18greens hit in regulation.
7.2 Visual Evidence
To get a sense of the importance of peer effects, we ﬁrst plot adjusted scores against playing
partners’ handicap. To do this, we ﬁrst regress each player’s score on tournament and category
ﬁxed effects and their interactions and the ‘leave-me-out’ mean of the tournament-by-categoryurn.
Then we take the residuals from this regression, compute means by each decile of the partners’
ability distribution, and graph the average residual against each decile bin. Figure 6 reports this
graph for the full sample, which shows zero correlation between own score and the ability of
randomly assigned playing partners. Those who were randomly assigned to partners with higher
average scores scored no differently than those who were assigned to partners with low average
scores. There also does not appear to be evidence of non-linear peer effects. We take this to be a
ﬁrst piece of evidence that peer effects among professional golfers are economically insigniﬁcant.
To place a conﬁdence interval around this estimate, we next estimate the linear regression model
in equation (3).
7.3 Regression Estimates of the Effect of Playing Partners’ Ability on Own
Score
The results of estimating equation (3) are shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 3. Since our measure
of ability is an average of varying numbers of prior adjusted scores, we weight all regressions
by the number of past performance observations used to compute Abilityi. Shown in column
(1), the coefﬁcient on own ability is strongly statistically signiﬁcant and large in magnitude, as
expected. A one-stroke increase in a player’s average score in past rounds is associated with an
increase in that player’s score of 0.678 strokes. That this coefﬁcient is not equal to 1 suggests
there is some measurement error in our measure of ability, but as a conditional reliability ratio this
is reasonably large in magnitude. If we think of ˆ b1 this way, then as we described above ˆ g1/ˆ b1 is
a measurement-error corrected estimate of the effect of partners’ ability on own score.
The estimate of g1, the effect of playing partners’ ability on own score, is not statistically
signiﬁcant, and the point estimate is actually negative. The insigniﬁcant point estimate suggests
that improving the average ability of one’s playing partners by one stroke actually increases (i.e.
19worsens) one’s score by 0.039 strokes. Our estimates make it possible to rule out positive peer
effects larger than 0.045 strokes for an increase in average abilityof one stroke. One strokeis about
50 percent more than one standard deviation in partners’ average ability (0.66). If we divide the
upper bound of the 95-percent conﬁdence interval by the estimate of ˆ b to correct for measurement
error, we can still rule out that a one-stroke increase in partners’ average ability increases own
score by more than 0.066 strokes. The results from our baselinespeciﬁcation therefore suggest that
there are not signiﬁcant peer effects overall. Column (2) veriﬁes that the results are insensitive to
controlling for player ﬁxed effects instead of player ability. Going forward, we report results from
the speciﬁcation that includes own ability rather than player ﬁxed effects for ease of interpretation.
7.4 The Effect of Different Dimensions of Ability: Does the Overall Effect
Hide Evidence of Learning or Motivation?
As described earlier, we collected data on various dimensions of player skill. We hypothesize
that players might learn about wind conditions or optimal strategies from more accurate players,
or from better putters. In contrast, we assume that players cannot learn how to hit longer drives
by playing alongside longer hitters. If these assumptions are correct, speciﬁcations comparable to
(3) but replacing partners’ average ability with partners’ average driving distance, putts per round,
or greens reached in regulation can separately identify learning and motivation effects. An effect
of the accuracy measures would be interpreted as evidence of learning from peers, while an effect
of partners’ driving distance would be interpreted as evidence of motivation by peers.32
The results are presented in columns (3)-(6) of Table 3. In column (3), we present results using
average driving distance. While the coefﬁcient on own driving distance is negative and strongly
statistically signiﬁcant (longer drives enable a player to achieve a lower score), the point estimate
on partners’ driving distance is small and statisticallyinsigniﬁcant. The results for putts per round,
shown in column (4), are similar. Own putting skill has a large and strongly signiﬁcant effect on
own score, but golfers do not appear to shoot lower scores when they play with better putters. The
results for shot accuracy, shown in column (5), similarly show strong effects of own accuracy, but
32One might argue that the former is a productioncomplementarityin the typologyset out at the outset of the paper,
but the latter is clearly a purely social peer effect.
20no effect of partners’ accuracy on a golfer’s performance.33 Finally we present a speciﬁcation
that jointly estimates the effects of all three measures of ability in column (6). A golfer’s putting
accuracy and number of greens hit in regulation have the most signiﬁcant effects on his score,34
but as in the separately estimated speciﬁcations, no dimension of his partners’ ability appears to
have any effect on score.
7.5 Using Alternative Measures of Peer Ability
Having seen no evidence that the average ability of peers affects individual performance, we next
ask whether thelinear-in-meansspeciﬁcation obscures peer effects in adifferent way. It ispossible
that it is notthemean abilityofcoworkers that matters, but rather theminor max. Possiblyplaying
with bad players matters, but playing with good players does not. Or, maybe playing alongside
one very good player or one very bad player affects performance. In each of these cases, the mean
ability of peers would not measure the relevant peer environment accurately. Motivated by these
possibilities, in Table 4 we present estimates of speciﬁcation (3) where Ability−i,kt is replaced with
alternative measures of peers’ ability. For comparison’s sake, we report the base speciﬁcation in
column (1), which shows that peers’ average ability has an insigniﬁcant effect on own score of
-0.039. In column (2) we replace the average ability with the maximum ability of the player’s
peers. The point estimate is slightly smaller, but virtually unchanged. In column (3), we show
that the estimated effect of the minimum of peers’ ability is again negative and insigniﬁcant, and
virtually the same as the average ability effect.
In columns (4) through (7), we investigate whether there appears to be a non-linear effect of
partners’ ability. To do this, we include indicators for whether individual i was assigned to a
player in the top decile, top quartile, bottom quartile, or bottom quintile of the ability distribution
in his category. None of the four estimates are statistically signiﬁcant, though suggestively the
point estimates for the top-quantile speciﬁcations are positive while those for the bottom-quantile
33We also collecteddata on drivingaccuracy,speciﬁcally the fraction of fairways the golfer hits on tee shots. We do
not include speciﬁcations using this variable because it does not strongly predict own score. This result is consistent
with the work of Alexander and Kern (2005), who ﬁnd large effects of putting accuracy on earnings, smaller effects
of driving distance on earnings, and very small effects of driving accuracy on earnings. When we do estimate peer
effects using driving accuracy, however, we ﬁnd no effect of partners’ driving accuracy on own score.
34Two old golﬁng cliches seem to be consistent with the data: “Drive for show, putt for dough” and “Hit fairways
and greens.”
21speciﬁcations are negative. Recall that lower scores are better, so this pattern would suggest that
players play worse when they are matched with much better players. We also ask whether playing
with Tiger Woods, the best player of his generation, affects performance. The point estimate
suggests that being partnered with Tiger Woods reduces golfers’ scores, but the standard errors are
large enough that we cannot rule out a zero effect. In our sample, there are only 70 golfer-days
paired with Tiger Woods.
The speciﬁcations thus far have assumed it is the absolute level of peers’ ability that affects
performance. An alternative hypothesis is that relative ability also matters. To investigate this
possibilitywepresentspeciﬁcationsthatallowtheeffect ofpeers’abilitytovarywiththedifference
between peers’ and own ability. These speciﬁcations are reported in columns (9) and (10) of
Table 4. The results suggest that the effect of peers’ ability does not vary with relative ability.
Furthermore, there does not seem to be a non-linear relationship with relative ability. We have also
looked at relative ability and non-linear effects using our other measures of ability and have found
similarly small and statistically insigniﬁcant results.
7.6 Endogenous Effect Regressions and Common Shocks
Table5 reports resultsofequation (4), thespeciﬁcation that replaces partners’abilitywith partners’
score as the regressor of interest. As described earlier, the coefﬁcient estimate on playing partners’
score overstates the true peer effect if there are unobserved common shocks affecting all players
uniformly in the group. Nevertheless, this regression is informative since it can be thought of as
providing an upper bound on g. The ﬁrst column in Table 5 shows, contrary to the results above,
that the peer effect is positive and statistically signiﬁcant—an increase in the average score of
one’s playing partners is associated with an increase of own score by 0.071 strokes. An important
point, however, is that without even accounting for the upward bias in this estimate due to common
shocks, thecoefﬁcient isstillsmallin magnitude. Mas and Moretti’s(2006)elasticitiesevaluatedat
the mean of ourdependent variable(own score), would predict that an increase in average partners’
score of one stroke would raise own score by 0.170 strokes, more than two times what we estimate.
We do not correct for measurement error here, since each player’s score, and therefore the average
22score of peers, is measured without error.35
To look at the importance of common shocks more systematically, we try several additional
controls. We hypothesize that the most likely sources of common shocks are variation in weather
and crowd size. Because these shocks also affect the playing groups nearby on the golf course,
we construct a control for common shocks which are the scores of the 8 groups ‘nearby’ on the
golf course (i.e. the groups playing directly in front of and behind the reference group on the golf
course).36
The results in column (2) show that the introduction of nearby playing groups as a control
reduces the point estimate on partners’ score by twenty percent (from 0.071 to 0.055), suggesting
that common shocks play a role. The estimate on partners’ score, however, remains statistically
signiﬁcant. To verify that the controls for the performance of nearby groups is actually estimating
a common shock we construct a placebo set of groups in the same tournament and verify that these
placebo groups do not affect the point estimate on partners’ score. This estimate is reported in
column (3). Indeed the estimate of g2 in columns (1) and (3) are virtually identical.
Lastly, we try two other controls for intraday common shocks. In column (4) we interact a
time-of-day (early morning, mid-morning, afternoon) ﬁxed effect with the full set of tournament
ﬁxed effects. This should capture weather shocks and other changes in course conditions that will
affect all groups that play at the same part of the day (a common complaint on the PGA Tour is
that afternoon groups experience more ‘spike marks’ on the green which make it more difﬁcult to
putt effectively). The point estimate on partners’ score drops again, and is almost identical to the
estimate that includes neighboring groups score as a control, but the estimate of partners’ score is
still statistically signiﬁcant. To capture the fact that weather varies more smoothly than the dummy
speciﬁcation assumes, in column (5) we introduce a cubic in start-time which is allowed to vary
35One might argue that score is a noisy measure of performance. Even though score is the measure by which
players are judged, a golfer may play well but have a high score because of a few unlucky bounces. In this case,
the measurement error correction used in the previous section will likely produce estimates that are too large because
Abilityi is an even noisier measure of the contemporaneous performance of player i than Score−i is of his partners’
contemporaneousperformance.
36In tournaments that use a 1-tee/10-tee split start, we also deﬁne nearby groups to be those groups that teed off
at the same time but on a different part of the golf course. Those groups play the holes in a different order, but
experience the same weather shock. We choose to use 8 nearby groups in order to get a more accurate estimate of the
common shocks component. We conducted Monte Carlo simulations which demonstrated that including only one or
two groups made it difﬁcult to fully control for the common shocks when the variance of common shocks was larger
than the variance in ability.
23by tournament. The coefﬁcient on partners’ score is further reduced to 0.038 and becomes only
marginally signiﬁcant. In additional speciﬁcations, we include higher-order polynomials in start-
time, which allow the effect of weather, and other common shocks that vary over the course of a
day, to vary more and more and more ﬂexibly. Moving across the columns, as the order of the
polynomial increases from a cubic to a quartic to a quintic the estimated effect of partners’ score
decreases. With the control for a quintic in start-time, the endogenous peer effect coefﬁcient is
0.022 and is insigniﬁcantly different from zero. Interestingly, adding controls for start-time or
for the scores of neighboring groups does not appear to affect the estimate of own ability on own
score. It appears that the correlations between own score and partners’ score are driven primarily
by common shocks.
As with any peer effects regression of own outcome on peer’s outcome it is difﬁcult to interpret
these regressions. They should certainly be regarded as upper bounds for peer effects since any
remaining common shocks that are not controlled for should bias the estimates upwards. Further-
more, regressions of outcomes on peers’ outcomes suffer from the ‘reﬂection problem’ described
by Manski (1993). In short, the fact that more and more extensive controls for common shocks
reduce the estimate of g2 but do not appreciably affect the estimate of b2, along with the fact that
the estimates of g1 are consistently zero, lead us to conclude that peer effects are negligible among
professional golfers.
7.7 Do Peer Effects Vary with Player Skill or Tournament Prize Structure?
One possibleexplanationfor why we ﬁnd such different results than previous studies is that profes-
sional golfers are elite professionals subject to a selection process. There may exist heterogeneity
in the susceptibility of workers to social inﬂuences by co-workers. And, perhaps the most success-
ful professional golfers are those who are able to avoid these social responses. If heterogeneity in
this ability across occupations explains the differences between our results and those in Mas and
Moretti (2006), it may also be the case that there is heterogeneity among golfers in the suscepti-
bility to social inﬂuences. In Table 6, we present estimates of equation (3) that allow the effect
of partners’ ability to vary by the reference player’s skill. This interaction tells us, for example,
24whether low-skill players respond more to high-skill players than high-skill players do.37 The
results are shown in columns (2) and (3). Although the coefﬁcient is suggestively positive, it is not
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Note however, that the coefﬁcient becomes larger
and statistically signiﬁcant if we drop category 1 players (see column (3)). A positive coefﬁcient
on this interaction term implies that lower-skilled players respond more to their co-workers’ ability
than better players do. The size of thestandard errors preventsus from making strong conclusions,
but the pattern of the point estimates in columns (2) and (3) is consistent with the idea that more
skilled workers are less responsive to peer effects.38
We next ask whether peer effects vary with the strength of ﬁnancial incentives. In column (4)
of Table 6 we present estimates from a speciﬁcation where we allow the effect of playing partners’
ability to vary with the total purse of the tournament.39 A negative coefﬁcient would imply that
larger ﬁnancial incentives reduce the peer effect. The estimated coefﬁcient is negative but statis-
tically insigniﬁcant. We have estimated speciﬁcations using measures of the dispersion of prizes
(e.g. the ratio of the 90th and 10th percentile of earnings, the ratio of the top prize to the average
prize, and the ratio of the standard deviation of prizes to the mean prize) and reproduce some of
them in columns (4)-(8), but each speciﬁcation produces large standard errors and inconsistent
magnitudes. It is thus hard to conclude much from these results, but it is worth noting here that
even in the tournaments in our sample with the smallest purses and the least convex prize structure,
ﬁnancial incentives are still very strong.
7.8 Why Are There No Peer Effects Among Professional Golfers?
Contrary to the ﬁndings from recent studies of peer effects in the workplace, we ﬁnd no evidence
that the ability or current performance of playing partners affects the performance of professional
golfers. Mas and Moretti (2006) ﬁnd large peer effects in a low-wage labor market where workers
are not paid piece rates and do not have strong ﬁnancial incentives to exert more effort. Bandiera,
37It is worth pointing out that high- and low-skill are relative terms. All professional golfers are extremely high-
skilled relative to the population.
38The comparisonof effects across categorieswouldseem to imply nodifferentialeffectby ability. Recall, however,
that there is a great deal of overlap of the ability distributions across categories. The highest ability category 3 players
are actually very skilled, even relative to the average category1 player. Thus, categoryis not a particularlygood proxy
for skill.
39All purse values are adjusted to 2006 dollars using the PCE deﬂator.
25Barankay and Rasul (2007) ﬁnd peer effects speciﬁc to workers’ friends in a low-skilled job where
workers are paid piece rates. Experimental studies (e.g. Falk and Ichino, 2006) ﬁnd evidence of
peer effects inwork-liketasks. In thissection wespeculateseveralexplanationsforourcontrasting
ﬁndings and conclude that there is much to be learned from the difference between our results and
those of other recent studies.
Firstly, the PGA Tour is a uniquelabor market that is characterized by extremely large ﬁnancial
incentives for performance. In such a situation, it may be the case that the incentives for high effort
are already so high that themarginal effect ofsocial considerationsare minimal, or zero. In similar
labor markets where there are high-powered incentives for better performance (e.g. ﬂoor traders
at an investment bank, lawyers in private practice, tenure track professors), the social effects of
peers may not be as important as implied by existing studies. Consistent with this view is Mas
and Moretti’s (2006) conclusion that the peer effects they observe are mediated by co-worker
monitoring. As incentives become stronger and monitoring output becomes easier, monitoring of
effort becomes less necessary.
Perhaps just as interesting is the implication that social incentives may be a substitute for ﬁ-
nancial incentives. This would suggest that when creating strong ﬁnancial incentives is difﬁcult
(such as when monitoring costs are high, or measuring individual output is difﬁcult), ﬁrms should
optimally organize workers to take advantage of social incentives.
Secondly, professional experience might lessen social inﬂuences like peer effects. The PGA
Tour is a competitive workplace, and given the random assignment of peers, players who do not
respondtotheperformanceoftheirpeers mightbemoreconsistentlysuccessful. It maybethecase
that as workers gain experience in highly-skilledoccupations they learn how to avoid unproductive
distractions or pressures not to make co-workers look bad.40
Lastly and, we speculate, most importantly,the sampleof workers under study has been subject
to extreme selection. Many people play golf, but only the very best are professional golfers. Even
among professionals, PGA Tour players are among the elite. It is quite possible that an important
selection criterion is the ability to avoid the inﬂuences of playing partners. The results described at
the end of the previous section are suggestively consistent with this view. Even among the highly
40This is consistent with the experimental work of List and Millimet (2006) which demonstrates that market expe-
rience contributes to individual rationality.
26selected group of professional golfers, the least skilled and least experienced golfers are the only
ones whose productivity respond to the composition of their peers. We view this as an interesting
conclusion because it suggests that there is a great deal of heterogeneity across individuals in their
susceptibility to social inﬂuences in the workplace. It is an open question whether professional
golfers are rare exceptions or representative of a larger class of skilled professional workers.
8 Conclusion
We use the random assignment of playing partners in professional golf tournaments to test for
peer effects in the workplace. Contrary to recent evidence on supermarket checkout workers and
soft-fruit pickers, we ﬁnd no evidence that the ability or current performance of playing partners
affects the performance of professional golfers. With a large panel data set we can observe players
repeatedly, and the random assignment of players to groups makes it straightforward to estimate
the causal effect of playing partners’ ability on own performance. The design of professional golf
tournaments also allows for direct examination of the role of common shocks, which typically
make identiﬁcation of endogenous peer effects difﬁcult. In our preferred speciﬁcation, we are
able to reject positive peer effects of more than 0.045 strokes for a one stroke increase in playing
partners’ ability. We are also able to rule out that the peer effect is larger than 6.6 percent of the
effect of own ability.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd a positive effect of partners’ score on own score, but we interpret this as
mostly due to common shocks (and we present evidence that controlling for these common shocks
reduces this correlation). The raw correlation in scores, though, might help explain why many
PGA players perceive peer effects to be important.41 Our results suggest that players might be
misinterpreting common shocks as peer effects.
We conclude by noting that though our results are different than those found in recent studies
of peer effects in the workplace, we view our results as complementary. There is much to learn
from the differences in ﬁndings. Primarily, our results suggest that there is heterogeneity in the
41For example, Darren Clarke (www.pga.com/pgachampionship/2004/news_interviews_081304_clarke.html)
stated that it is easier to play better when everyone in the group is playing better because “you see good shots
go into the green all the time and that makes it a lot easier to do the same yourself”, and Billy Andrade
(i.pga.com/pga/images/events/2006/pgachampionship/pdf/20060818_andrade.pdf) said “you kind of feed off each
other and that’s what we did.”
27importance of peer effects, both across individuals and across settings. We speculate that some
people are better than others at avoiding the social effects found by Moretti and Mas (2006) and by
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2007). This ability may be one thing that characterizes workers in
high-skilled labor markets. By focusing on low-skilled occupations, the existing studies miss this
rich heterogeneity. Perhaps just as importantly, we show that peer effects are not important in a
setting with strong ﬁnancial incentives. This ﬁnding suggests that social effects may be substitutes
for incentive pay, and is consistent at least in spirit with the work of List (2006) and Levitt and List
(2007) who argue that the expression of social preferences is likely to vary according to whether
behavior is observed in a market setting, the strength of incentives in that setting, and the selection
of subjects that researchers observe. We hope our ﬁndings will spur other researchers to further
explore this heterogeneity in peer effects in the workplace.
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31Appendix A: Introduction to Golf
The objective in golf is to take the fewest number of strokes on each hole to hit a 1.7-inch
golf ball into a 4.25-inch cup. The player with the lowest total number of strokes over all holes
is the winner. Golf holes typically are between 150 and 600 yards in length, and they often have
‘hazards’ (e.g. sand traps, water hazards, out-of-bounds areas, and tall trees) that require skill and
strategy to avoid. The cup is placed on an area of shorter grass called the ‘green’. The grass is cut
shorter on the green so that the ball rolls smoothly when it is struck. Such rolling shots are called
‘putts’.
The ﬁrst shot on each hole is the tee shot. All players hit their tee shot from the same tee area.
This is the only shot where the player is allowed to place the ball on a wooden tee which holds
the ball slightly above the ground. There is an area between the tee area and the green called the
‘fairway’ where the grass is cut short (though longer than the grass on the green). On either side of
the fairway is longer grass called the ‘rough’. It is easier to hit the ball when it is sitting on shorter
grass.
There are three types of holes: par-3 holes, par-4 holes, and par-5 holes. The par indicates
the number of strokes in which the hole is expected to be completed. On a par-3 hole, the typical
strategy is to attempt to hit the tee shot directly onto the green. For a par-4 hole, the typical strategy
is to reach the green in two shots. For a par-5 hole, the typical strategy is to reach the green in three
shots.42
Inside the cup is a 7 foot ﬂagstick called the ‘pin’. The pin allows the players to see from a
distance where the cup is on the putting green. Often the cup is placed near the edge of the green
and near hazards (e.g. sand traps and water hazards), creating a risk-reward trade-off: if a player
wants to try to hit his approach shot near the cup, he increases the chance that he hits into a hazard.
Many golf shots present similar risk-reward trade-offs. For example, on a par-4 a player might
want to hit a driver (which is the golf club that allows the player to hit the ball the farthest, but
which is the most difﬁcult to control) to leave himself the shortest approach shot into the putting
green (since players have more control and accuracy over shorter approach shots). However, it is
42A combination of better golf technology and more athletic golfers, however, have transformed most par-5 holes
on the PGA Tour into ‘long par 4-holes’ where a majority of the golfers can reach the putting green in one approach
shot.
32harder to hit the tee shot onto the fairway with a driver, and tee shots that miss the fairway and land
in the rough leave more difﬁcult approach shots.
33Appendix B: Player Categories and Random Assignment
Based on their past performance over their career, players are placed in one of four categories:
1, 1A, 2, and 3. The categories are assigned using the following rules:
• Category 1 players are tournament winners and the top 25 money winners from the previous
year and PGA Tour life members (e.g. Tiger Woods, Phil Mickelson and Ernie Els).
• Category 1A players include former champions of the four majors and The Players Champi-
onship (e.g. former British Open champions John Daly and Nick Faldo).
• Category 2 players include those in the top 125, players with 50 or more career cuts made
and players in the top 50 of the World Golf Rankings. This encompasses the majority of the
ﬁeld most weeks.
• Category 3 includes all others, such as local qualiﬁers. These golfers get the ﬁrst and last tee
times of each session. When Annika Sorenstam became the ﬁrst woman in 58 years to play
in a PGA Tour event, she was a Category 3 player and was assigned the earliest and latest
tee times in her two rounds.
Although there are four categories of players, the 1A and 2 players are paired together ran-
domly, so for our purposes we re-label 1A players as category 2 players and work only with three
categories of players. There is an additional complication, though, which is that players might be
paired with players from a different category if the number of players in a given category is not a
multiple of three. In that case category 1A players are paired with category 1 players and category
3 players are paired with category 2 players.
Categories are assigned at the beginning of the season, and for the most part the category
assignments are static. However, if a player wins a tournament or enters the top 25 money list, then
thatplayercan be‘promoted’toCategory1 statusduringtheseason. Likewise,ifaplayerdropsout
of the top 50 World Golf Ranking and does not satisfy the other deﬁnitions of a Category 2 player,
then that player is ‘demoted’ to Category 3 status during the season. We are never able to directly
observe players changing categories in our data. In the 2002 season, we have two ‘snapshots’ of
category status directly from the PGA Tour (at the beginning of the season and halfway through
the season). In the 2005-2006 seasons, we were not able to get the category status of the players on
34the tour, but we used the deﬁnitions aboveto assign players as best we could at the beginningof the
season, and then we used a probabilistic matching algorithm to assign the remaining players. We
tested the matching algorithm on the 2002 season (where we had the categories given to us directly
from the PGA Tour) and we veriﬁed that we got more than 99 percent of category assignments
correct.
The algorithm works as follows: we start with a list of players where we are sure we know
the category status throughout the season (this is most obvious for elite players, former major
champions, and former Nationwide Tour players). Then we look at every playing partner of those
players during the season and assign the playing partners to the same category. For players who
get matched to different categories, we ﬂag them and manually decide which category they belong
to.
Using thesecategories wetest forrandom assignmentby tournamentand wedrop thefollowing
tournaments which fail the test for random assignment: The Masters, U.S. Open, British Open,
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Figure 6: Scores for the entire sample
41(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Avg(Ability),  0.159 0.116 -0.019                                            -0.017 -0.004 -0.063
   partners (0.021) (0.020) (0.016)                                            (0.015) (0.017) (0.046)
Avg(Driv. Dist.),                                             0.007
   partners                                            (0.014)
Avg(Putts),                                                          -0.003
   partners                                                          (0.012)
Avg(Greens/rd),                                                                         -0.001
   partners                                                                        (0.014)
Tourn F.E. Y N YYYYYYY
Cat F.E. N YYYYYYYY
Tourn*Cat F.E. N N YYYYYYY
Keep only Cat 1 NNNNNNYNN
Keep only Cat 2 NNNNNNNYN
Keep only Cat 3 NNNNNNNNY
R
2 0.133 0.158 0.626 0.727 0.545 0.723 0.851 0.735 0.595
N 8750 8750 8750 8587 8587 8587 2947 5067 736
Table 1
Verification of Random Assignment
Notes: 
a.  Results from estimating equation (2).
b.  Avg(Ability) is the average handicap of a player's playing partners, as described in the text.
c.  All specifications include the average of all of the other players in your tournament-by-category urn (not 
including yourself).  This control is necessary to produce a well-behaved randomization test.
d.  All specifications include tournament fixed effects.  Note that the 'urn' in column (1) is defined to be 
tournament cells instead of tournament-by-category cells (this confirms that our test can detect non-random 
assignment).
e.  Columns (3)-(9) include tournament-by-player-category interaction dummies to pick up selection into 
tournaments.
f.  Columns (7)-(9) impose various sample restrictions.
g.  Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by playing group.
h.  All specifications are unweighted (unlike the specifications in the other tables), since the weighting is not 
appropriate for the randomization test.Variable Obs Mean Std Dev. Min 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Max
Score 17403 71.182 3.183 61 67.0 69.0 71.0 73.0 75.0 89
Avg(Score), partners 17403 71.236 2.490 62 68.0 69.5 71.0 73.0 74.5 85
Ability (Handicap) 17403 -2.38 0.78 -4.32 -3.19 -2.83 -2.45 -2.03 -1.54 5.635
Avg(Ability), partners 17403 -2.37 0.66 -5.08 -3.05 -2.77 -2.44 -2.10 -1.68 5.285
Driving distance (yards) 17077 281.02 9.88 238.80 269.10 274.04 280.10 288.00 293.30 324
Putts per round 17077 28.67 1.03 24.07 27.34 28.04 28.83 29.34 29.72 33.500
Greens per round 17077 11.60 0.65 7.00 10.86 11.33 11.66 11.97 12.32 14.994
Purse (in millions, 2006$) 15985 4.40 0.85 2.27 3.24 3.78 4.32 5.11 5.50 6.000
log(Purse) 15985 15.28 0.20 14.63 14.99 15.14 15.28 15.45 15.52 16
Tiger Woods in group 17403 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1
Category 1 players
Ability 5863 -2.62 0.68 -4.32 -3.46 -3.05 -2.69 -2.22 -1.75 5.635
Avg(Ability), partners 5863 -2.62 0.50 -4.25 -3.23 -2.95 -2.63 -2.31 -2.00 0.562
Category 2 players
Ability 10075 -2.37 0.64 -3.57 -3.10 -2.75 -2.44 -2.05 -1.72 2.741
Avg(Ability), partners 10075 -2.36 0.53 -5.08 -2.94 -2.70 -2.40 -2.10 -1.79 2.741
Category 3 players
Ability 1465 -1.46 1.20 -4.00 -2.62 -2.19 -1.54 -0.94 -0.24 5.285
Avg(Ability), partners 1465 -1.49 1.10 -4.00 -2.62 -2.21 -1.60 -0.99 -0.28 5.285
Notes:        
a.  See Appendix B for more information on player categories.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
percentiles(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Own Ability 0.678 0.949 0.544 0.784 0.566
(0.084) (0.074) (0.077) (0.129) (0.071)
Avg(Ability), -0.039 -0.026 0.013 -0.068 -0.003 -0.057
partners (0.042) (0.040) (0.095) (0.071) (0.115) (0.062)












Tourn*Cat F.E. Y YYYYY Y Y YY
Player F.E. N YNNNNNNNN
C a t = 1 o n l y NNNNNNYNNN
C a t = 2 o n l y NNNNNNNYNN
C a t = 3 o n l y NNNNNNNNYN
D r o p C a t 1 NNNNNNNNNY
R
2 0.143 0.208 0.131 0.130 0.138 0.141 0.152 0.122 0.211 0.129
N 17403 17403 17077 17077 17077 17077 5863 10075 1465 11540
Table 3
The Effect of Peers' Ability on Own Score
Notes:
a. Results from baseline specifications as specified in equation (1).
b. The dependent variable is the golf score for the round.
c. The Ability variable is measured using the player's handicap, and "Avg(Ability), partners" is measured using the average of your
playing partners' handicaps. The Avg() operator takes the average of the variable for for the playing partners in your group.
d. All specifications include tournament fixed effects, player category fixed effects, and tournament-by-player-category interaction
dummies. Also, all specifications include a control for the mean ability of the other players in your tournament-by-category urn (where
the mean is calculated over all other players in your cell not including yourself).
e. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by playing group.
f. All specifications weight each observation by the number of tournaments used to construct the player's handicap.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Own Ability 0.678 0.678 0.677 0.678 0.676 0.678 0.680 0.679 0.674 0.681
(0.084) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.079) (0.080)






1{any partner in top 10%} 0.036
(0.072)
1{any partner in top 25%} 0.061
(0.064)
1{any partner in bot 25%} -0.022
(0.075)
1{any partner in bot 10%} -0.102
(0.157)
Tiger Woods is partner -0.354
(0.500)
Avg(Ability), partners * -0.004 -0.035
(Avg(Ability), partners - Own Ability) (0.021) (0.047)
Avg(Ability), partners * 0.008
(Avg(Ability), partners - Own Ability)
2 (0.009)
Tourn*Cat F.E. Y YYYYY YYYY
R
2 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.141 0.141
N 17403 17370 17370 17396 17396 17396 17396 17403 17403 17403
Notes:
a. Column (1) is reproduced from Table 3. Other columns present results from modifying baseline specifications as specified in equation (1) to
support heterogeneous peer effects.
b. The dependent variable is the golf score for the round.
c. The Ability variable is measured using the player's handicap, and "Avg(Ability), partners" is measured using the average playing partners'
handicap. The Avg() operator takes the average of the variable for the playing partners in your group.
d. All specifications include tournament fixed effects, player category fixed effects, and tournament-by-player-category interaction dummies.
Also, all specifications include a control for the mean ability of the other players in your tournament-by-category urn (where the mean is
calculated over all other players in your cell not including yourself).
e. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by playing group.
f. All specifications weight each observation by the number of tournaments used to construct the player's handicap.
Table 4
Peer Effects with Alternative Measures of Peer Ability(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Own Ability 0.682 0.651 0.681 0.684 0.680 0.642 0.677 0.683
(0.074) (0.094) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.095) (0.076) (0.077)
Avg(Score), 0.071 0.055 0.072 0.056 0.038 0.022 0.030 0.022
partners (0.012) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
Avg(Score), 0.159 0.130
neighboring groups (0.015) (0.017)
Avg(Score), -0.020
placebo groups (0.019)
T o u r n * C a t F . E . YYYYYYYY
T o u r n * T i m e - o f - d a y F . E .NNNYNNNN
Time cubic per tourney NNNNYYNN
Time quartic per tourney NNNNNNYN
Time quintic per tourney NNNNNNNY
R
2 0.143 0.159 0.143 0.151 0.161 0.18 0.165 0.17
N 17403 13171 17403 17403 17403 13171 17403 17403
Table 5
The Effect of Peers' Score on Own Score
Notes:
a. Results from alternate specifications using average partners' score instead of average partners' ability as the primary independent
variable of interest.
b. The dependent variable is the golf score for the round.
c. The Ability variable is measured using the player's handicap, and "Avg(score), partners" is the average of the score of the playing
partners. The placebo groups are formed by drawing a random sample of groups in the same tournament.
d. All specifications include tournament fixed effects and player category fixed effects.
e. All columns include tournament-by-player-category interaction dummies to pick up selection into tournaments.
f. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by playing group.
g. All specifications weight each observation by the number of tournaments used to construct the handicap.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Own Ability 0.678 0.752 0.538 0.702 0.702 0.349 0.697 0.697 0.352
(0.084) (0.052) (0.071) (0.080) (0.080) (0.158) (0.080) (0.080) (0.158)
Avg(Ability), partners -0.039 -0.041 -0.083 -0.055 -0.055 -0.062 -0.054 -0.054 -0.062
(0.042) (0.052) (0.062) (0.054) (0.054) (0.076) (0.054) (0.054) (0.076)
Avg(Ability), partners * 0.087 0.191
Own Ability 0.065 (0.075)
Avg(Ability), partners * -0.027 -0.034
Purse (0.063) 0.063
Avg(Ability), partners * -0.114 -0.144
log(Purse) (0.255) (0.258)
Avg(Ability), partners * 0.114 0.111
(90-10 prize ratio) (0.096) (0.097)
Own Ability * -0.104
Purse (0.060)
Own Ability * -0.104
log(Purse) (0.060)
Own Ability * -0.120
(90-10 prize ratio) (0.108)
Tourn*Cat F.E. Y Y YYY Y Y Y Y
D r o p C a t 1 NNYNNNNNN
R
2 0.143 0.143 0.129 0.142 0.142 0.179 0.143 0.143 0.179
N 17403 17403 11540 15985 15985 5824 15985 15985 5824
Notes:
a. Column (1) is reproduced from Table 3. Other columns present results from modifying baseline specifications as specified in equation
(1) to support heterogeneous peer effects.
b. The dependent variable is the golf score for the round.
c. The Ability variable is measured using the player's handicap, and Avg(partners' Ability) is measured using the average playing partners'
handicap. The Avg() operator takes the average of the variable for for the playing partners in your group.
d. All specifications include tournament fixed effects, player category fixed effects, and tournament-by-player-category interaction
dummies. Also, all specifications include a control for the mean ability of the other players in your tournament-by-category urn (where the
mean is calculated over all other players in your cell not including yourself).
e. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by playing group.
f. All specifications weight each observation by the number of tournaments used to construct the player's handicap.
Table 6
Do Peer Effects Vary with Player Skill or Tournament Prize Structure?